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THE 2020 BELGIAN CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR
Introduction
The 9th of May 2019 the Corporate Governance 
Committee published the long expected new 
2020 Belgian Code on Corporate Governance. 
The Code replaces the previous 2009 Code 
that itself replaced the 2004 Code. Before 
2004 several organisations, including the 
predecessors of the FSMA and Euronext and 
the employers’ association FEB/VBO published 
different corporate governance codes.
Already in 2017 the Corporate Governance 
Committee, chaired by mr. Thomas leysen, 
launched a public consultation for the revision 
of the 2009 Code accompanied with a detailed 
study of allen & oVery that reported on the 
needs for revision. In spring 2018 a public 
hearing took place. In July 2018 the Committee 
announced that the Code would be published 
soon, but in January 2019 the Committee 
informed the market that this publication was 
postponed. The delay found its roots in the 
long process for the approval of the new Code 
of Companies and Associations (CCA). Shortly 
after the enactment of the CCA on 23 March 
2019 and its publication in the Official Gazette 
on 4 April 2019, the 2020 Code was presented 
to the public. Contrary to the former editions of 
the Companies Code, the relationship between 
the corporate governance code and the CCA 
is explicitly acknowledged in the latter, inter 
alia regarding the identification of independent 
directors for which article 7:87 CCA refers to 
the Code of good governance that the King 
indicates1. The new 2020 Code will serve as the 
referential code for listed companies for their 
corporate governance statement in accordance 
with article 3:6, § 2 CCA. The Royal Decree of 
11 May 2019 as published in the Belgian Official 
Gazette of 17 May 2019 identified this Code as 
the only referential code for the Belgian listed 
companies.2
From the 1st of January 2020 those companies 
that are submitted to the Code must apply this 
Code for their reporting years that start after this 
date. It can be expected that some companies 
will not wait to report in their corporate 
1 As required by European Directive 46/2006/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types 
of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/
EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks 
and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings, 
Pb. L. 16 August 2006, nr. 224.
 h t t p s : / / e u r - l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N /
TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006L0046
2 It must be noted that the Council of State that was consulted 
for rendering its advice on the proposal for the Royal Decree 
considered this request as inadmissible as the King is only 
authorized for “indicating” the Code, not for setting the 
Code. Further, the Council of State noted that the Corporate 
Governance Committee is not a governmental body.
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governance statement 2020, which will be 
published in the spring of 2021 but already 
start reporting accordingly in 2020 (corporate 
governance statement 2019). The Code 
identifies the companies that are submitted as 
“companies incorporated in Belgium whose 
shares are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market (‘listed companies’) as defined by the 
Code on Companies and Associations”. Listed 
companies are companies of which shares, 
profit shares or certificates of shares are 
admitted for trading on a regulated market.3
The overarching goals of the new Code is 
helping companies in their development and 
reaching out for sustainability.4 Similar to the 
previous 2009 Code, the 2020 Code requires 
the companies to comply with its principles 
and comply with all the provisions or explain 
the deviations. The principles are “considered 
as essential pillars of good governance.”5 The 
provisions are recommendations as to how 
the different principles can be effectively 
3 A regulated market is a by a market operator operated and/
or managed multilateral system that brings together multiple 
buy or sell intentions of third parties with regard to financial 
instruments or facilitates the process of bringing these intentions 
together within this system according to the rules and systems 
of the market admitted for trading and for which a permit has 
been granted and which works regularly (in accordance with 
Directive 2014/65/EU). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0065
 h t t p s : / / e u r- l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / T X T /
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065&from=FR
 h t t p s : / / e u r- l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / N L / T X T /
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065&from=FR
4 Foreword by the chairman, 4. 







implemented. Different from the ten principles, 
it is allowed for a company to provide an 
adequate explanation for deviating from one 
or more provisions.6 The 2009 Code also 
contained guidelines providing in guidance how 
the companies should implement or interpret 
the provisions. Guidelines are no longer part 
of the 2020 Code. A number of the guidelines 
have been deleted while other guidelines have 
been transposed in provisions.
In the next sections, we first briefly enumerate 
the ten corporate governance principles of 
the 2020 Code. Next, in the major part of this 
paper we assess the provisions of the Code and 
discuss the position of the external auditor in 
the next section. The last section provides in a 
conclusion.
The Ten Corporate Governance Principles
The new code contains 10 Principles, one more 
than its predecessor. The principles are:
Principle 1. The company shall make an explicit 
choice regarding its governance structure and 
clearly communicate it
Principle 2. The board and the executive 
management shall remain within their respective 
remits and interact constructively
Principle 3. The company shall have an effective 
and balanced board
Principle 4. Specialised committees shall assist 
the board in the execution of its responsibilities
Principle 5. The company shall have a 
transparent procedure for the appointment of 
board members
6 It can be questioned when a company deviates from a large 
number of recommendations that exist for the implementation 
of a particular principle, the latter principle is still complied with.
SUSTAINABLE VALUE CREATION 
IS A NEW CORPORATE 
PARADIGM
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Principle 6. All board members shall demonstrate 
independence of mind and shall always act in 
the best interests of the company
Principle 7. The company shall remunerate 
board members and executives fairly and 
responsibly
Principle 8. The company shall treat all 
shareholders equally and respect their rights
Principle 9. The company shall have a rigorous 
and transparent procedure for evaluating its 
governance regime
Principle 10. The company shall publicly report 
on the application of the code
The 2009 Code contained only 9 principles. The 
new code does not add a new tenth principle 
but four of the former 2009 principles have now 
assorted in six of the new 2020 principles. For 
example, the previous 2009 principle 4 related 
to the rigorous and transparent procedure of 
appointing and evaluating the board of the 
directors and its members is now included in 
principle 5 regarding the appointment of the 
board and principle 9 regarding the evaluation 
of corporate governance. Similarly, the 2009 
principles 1, 3 and 6 are now included in the 
2020 principles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9.
Most principles already existed in an identical or 
similar form or in an embryonic style in the 2009 
Code. For example, principle 7 of the 2009 Code 
not only survived in the 2020 Code, it remained 
unchanged. All board members should receive 
a fair and responsible remuneration package. 
However, the composition of the remuneration 
packages must in the 2020 Code comply with 
other provisions than those enumerated in the 
2009 Code7. Non-executive directors should, 
according to the 2020 Code be partially paid in 
shares, whereas the 2009 Code remained silent 
regarding share-based remuneration for non-
executive directors.
7 Cf. infra, section 3.
A short assessment of the principles and 
provisions
Principle 1 of the 2020 Code requires the 
company to reflect on its governance structure 
of a one-tier or two-tier board. Chapter 1 
of Title 4 of Book 7 of the CCA distinguishes 
between two different board models: the 
monistic board model which is the model that 
existed at least since the Companies Act of 1873 
and consists of one fraternal board of directors 
and a two-tier board model that consists of a 
supervisory board and a management board. 
The former is responsible for the general policy 
and strategy of the company, for monitoring the 
management board and for all deeds for which 
the CCA empowers the supervisory board. The 
management board is responsible for all other 
deeds. Principle 1 requires from each company 
a recurrent reflection which governance model 
serves the company best. This principle is 
different from principle 1 in the 2009 Code that 
started from the premise of a one-tier board 
developing the best strategy for the company. 
More precisely, the board of directors of a one-
tier company must assess once every five years 
whether this governance structure is the most 
appropriate, whilst the supervisory board should 
do the same if the company has opted for the 
two-tier board structure. In the latter structure, 
the supervisory board should, if need be, propose 
the general meeting of shareholders, to abolish 
itself. Why the Commission did not consider the 
involvement of the management board when 
assessing the abolishment of the supervisory 
board is not clear. Every year the company must 
disclose the relevant information on the events 
affecting the governance structure.
Further, in some industries, like the financial 
industry, companies must take into account the 
lex specialis. A bank that is established as a public 
limited liability company must be governed 
by a management board in accordance with 
article 7:104 CCA of which all members are 
also members of the ‘board of directors’.8 The 
8 Art. 24 of the Banking Act of 25 April 2014.
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Banking Act was modified to enter some of the 
specificities of the dual system as provided in 
the CCA but retained the former governance 
names “management committee” and “board of 
directors”.9 As this bank governance structure 
is mandatory, the banking legislation offers 
banks no room for any kind of reflection of its 
governance structure.
Principle 2 emphasizes the division of powers 
between the different board and management 
levels. Further, sustainable value creation 
is a new corporate paradigm. The board of 
directors must guarantee, through its setting of 
the company’s strategy, ethical leadership and 
monitoring corporate performance that this 
kind of value creation has achieved. Further, 
the board must balance both the interests 
and expectations of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. At the same time, provision 6.6 
also requires the board members “to look after 
the interests of all shareholders on an equivalent 
basis”. The 2009 Code did not yet reach out 
for sustainable value creation, only a guideline 
accompanying provision 1.2 related to defining 
the strategy and values of the company provides 
in the recommendation of paying “attention to 
corporate social responsibility, gender diversity 
and diversity in general”.
This innovative principle 2 brings the 2020 
Corporate Governance Code in line with the 
Codes of other Western European countries. In 
the 2016 Dutch Corporate Governance Code, 
Principle 1.1 on Long-Term value creation 
states: “The management board focuses on 
long-term value creation for the company and 
its affiliated enterprise, and takes into account 
the stakeholder interests that are relevant 
in this context”. The notes to this Dutch 
Principle add: “Management board members 
and supervisory board members are expected 
to act in a sustainable manner …”. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2018 articulates in 
9 For an extensive analysis of the effects of the new CCA on the 
financial industry see L. thiJs and C. haVerans, “Het nieuwe WVV 
en de KREDIETINSTELLING: simple comme bonjour?”, Bank. Fin. 
R. 2019, 183-231.
Principle A: “[…] the board, whose role is to 
promote the long-term sustainable success of 
the company, generating value for shareholders 
and contributing to wider society and adds in 
provision 1: “The board should assess the basis 
on which the company generates and preserves 
value over the long-term”. In the French AFEP-
MEDEF 2018 Corporate Governance Code 
of Listed Companies it sounds: “[The Board] 
endeavors to promote long-term value creation 
by the company by considering the social and 
environmental aspects of its activities”.
Most of the other provisions of Principle 2 
further specify the specific duties of the board 
of directors and the executive management as 
well as the interaction between the board and 
the executive management. Principle 2 is to be 
considered pivotal in the Code as it contains the 
most provisions of all principles.
Principle 3 contains the framework for a 
balanced board composition. Many provisions 
in this principle remain unchanged. The board 
of directors should be composed of a majority 
of non-executive directors. At least three 
directors must be independent and the 2009 
guideline of balancing size, experience and 
knowledge turned in the 2020 edition into a 
provision. Principle 3 – Principle 2 in the 2009 
Code – gained importance as the conditions 
for being considered as an independent 
director are provided in this principle. Those 
conditions have transferred from article 526ter 
of the former Companies Code. The new CCA 
contains (only) two general conditions that 
IF NOT ALL CONDITIONS 
FOR DEVIATING FROM THE 
PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED, CAN 
THE DIRECTOR BE CONSIDERED 
“INDEPENDENT ENOUGH”
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independent directors have to meet and refers 
to the Corporate Governance Code for the 
criteria of which compliance result in adherence 
with those two general conditions in the CCA. 
The CCA requires from the independent 
directors that they have no relationship with 
the company or with an important shareholder 
that could jeopardize the independence.10 
In case the director is a legal entity, both the 
latter and its representative have to meet 
these requirements. The assessment of the 
compliance with the Companies Act must take 
into account all the criteria in the Corporate 
Governance Code 2020. The conditions in 
the Corporate Governance Code 2020 are 
very similar to those laid down in the former 
Companies Code, but not all are identical. For 
example, previously a former executive of a 
company could not become an independent 
director before a cooling-off period of five 
years was taken into account. In the Corporate 
Governance Code 2020 a cooling-off period 
of three years before the appointment of the 
former executive is sufficient.
Further, in the former Companies Code the 
criteria the new CCA allows that not all criteria 
have been complied with for becoming an 
independent director if the board of directors 
informs the general meeting of shareholders 
why the director is effectively independent.11 
This option was not provided in the former 
system.
This new approach of establishing the 
independence requirements has important 
consequences for the registered auditors. 
For example, the board of directors of a 
company that has not established an audit 
committee can permit the external auditor 
to provide in additional services of which the 
consideration exceeds the remuneration of the 
external auditor for providing in its opinion in 
accordance with article 3:65, § 2 of the Belgian 
CCA, only if the independent director or the 
10 Art. 7:87, § 1, section 1 Belgian CCA.
11 Art. 7:87, § 1, section 2 Belgian CCA.
majority of the independent directors agree to 
approve those services.12 We are of the opinion 
that the external auditor must control whether 
the company complies with the new procedure 
for determining the independence of those 
directors before making use of the option for 
rendering additional services.
Principle 3 has also further elaborated on the 
company secretary with three provisions (the 
former Code contained only one provision 
and a guideline with respect to the company 
secretary). This secretary has a legal position 
according the UK Companies Act13, but it lacks 
a legal connection under Belgian law. While 
the competence of the company secretary did 
not significantly change with the exception of 
a task defined in provision 10.2, the promotion 
of a 2009 guideline into a provision in the 
2020 Code requires companies to spend more 
attention to and report on the position, if any, 
and competences of this company secretary. 
According to provision 10.2 it belongs to the 
company secretary to make sure that the board 
of directors assesses the explanations of the 
deviations from the provisions at least once a 
year.
Principle 4 provides the companies with further 
provisions on how to establish subcommittees 
within the board of directors. The 2020 
Corporate Governance Code recommends 
the establishment of an audit committee, a 
remuneration committee and a nomination 
committee. However, the latter can be 
12 Art. 3:64, § 4 Belgian CCA. The company can make use of two 
other options to have those services approved. 
13 See Section 271 UK Companies Act: “A public company must 
have a secretary”.
FOR THE BELGIAN CODE 2020, 
THE QUESTION CAN BE RAISED: 
WHERE ARE THE EXTERNAL 
AUDITORS?
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combined with the remuneration committee. 
Those subcommittees must perform the 
duties that have been defined in the CCA. For 
audit committees the duties of the committee 
follow from the transposition of European 
Directive 2006/43/EU14 and includes inter alia 
the monitoring of the work of the external 
auditor. For remuneration committees, 
the Belgian legislator considered their 
establishment and duties pivotal for enforcing 
corporate governance in 2010, including the 
duty of proposing the remuneration policy15. 
The 2020 Code further elaborates on the 
tasks of those committees, which should be 
read in accordance with the legal duties. For 
example, it is the role of the audit committee 
to monitor the management responsiveness to 
the recommendations of the external auditor’s 
management letter16, which can be seen as 
part of the legal duty of the audit committee 
to monitor the follow up of the questions and 
recommendations of the external auditor17.
The differences in the scope of application 
of the CCA and the 2020 Code regarding the 
establishment of the audit committee and the 
remuneration committee, create a number of 
ambiguities. While the CCA mandatorily requires 
the establishment of the former two committees 
only for the larger companies18, all listed 
companies must, for acting in compliance with 
the 2020 Code, establish three committees19. 
A first ambiguity exists for the companies that 
do not mandatorily have to establish an audit 
committee and a remuneration committee20, 
14 For an analysis of the legal duties of the audit committee, 
see for example C. Van Der elst and I. De Poorter, “Upgrading 
corporate governance: auditcomités in het Wetboek van 
Vennootschappen”, TRV 2009, 397-415. 
15 For an analysis of this remuneration committee, see for 
example H. De wulf, C. Van Der elst, S. VerMeesCh, “Radicalisering 
van corporate governance-regelgeving: remuneratie en 
transparantie na de wet van 6 april 2010”, TBH 2010, (909), 939-
945. 
16 Provision 4.12 of the Code.
17 Art. 7:99, § 4, 4° Belgian CCA.
18 See art. 7:99, § 3 and 7:100, § 4 Belgian CCA.
19 The remuneration and nomination committee can be combined 
(provision 4.20).
20 See for the criteria for this waiver: art. 7:99, § 3 Belgian CCA.
but must consider their establishment as a best 
practice at least, and, more likely, even as a 
principle. Principle 4 requires subcommittees 
to assist the board, which can only be complied 
with if the subcommittees are established. 
Therefore it can be debated whether those 
companies can validly explain the option of not 
establishing any subcommittee. On the other 
side, if companies that do not legally have to 
establish subcommittees must establish those 
committees according to the 2020 Code, the 
Corporate Governance Commission takes the 
position of legislator.
Further, in case a company must not legally 
establish those committees21, the company 
can comply with provision 4.10 and 4.17, and 
in accordance with article 7:98 CCA establish 
an audit committee, a remuneration and a 
nomination committee. Article 7:98 CCA allows 
every board to establish any subcommittee 
of which it determines its composition and 
duties. The board of directors remains liable. 
The three aforementioned committees have 
to be provided with different duties than 
those that are enumerated in article 7:99 and 
7:100 CCA. However, companies submitted 
to the 2020 Code, but exempted from the 
legal duty to establish an audit committee and 
a remuneration committee, must establish 
those committees in accordance with the 
provisions of the 2020 Code and empower the 
committees with the duties as defined in article 
7:99 and 7:100 CCA. However, according to 
article 7:99, § 2 and 7:100, § 4 CCA the board of 
directors must perform those duties of the audit 
committee and the remuneration committee 
in case those committees have not been 
established. Therefore, according to the CCA 
those responsibilities belong to the board and 
according to the 2020 Code to the committees. 
It is not obvious for those companies to comply 
with all the requirements22.
21 Which is the case if the size criteria that the CCA defines for 
establishing those committees have not been met.
22 Unless the company explains why it deviates from the 2020 
Code.
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Principle 5 of the Code 2020, regarding the 
appointment of the members of the board 
repeats to a very large extent principle 4 of the 
2009 Code. There are only minor changes in the 
new 2020 Code. One is the promotion of the 
guidelines to develop a process of succession 
planning in the 2009 Code into a provision in 
the 2020 Code.
The interest of the company must be the 
guiding principle of a director, according to 
principle 6. The board should also demonstrate 
independence of mind. This kind of 
independence did not constitute a principle in 
the 2009 Code but it results from a reshuffling of 
the structure of the Code. The preamble of the 
2009 Code mentions that “All directors should 
demonstrate independence of judgement 
and objectivity in making board decisions”. 
Principle 6 of the 2020 Code states that “board 
members […] should be able to make their own 
[…] independent judgements when discharging 
their responsibilities”.
Further, the new Code spends several 
provisions on conflicts of interests. Both the 
former Companies Code as well as the current 
Code of Companies and Association provide in 
a detailed set of rules how to address conflicts 
of interest, which the Corporate Governance 
Code 2020 even further elaborates with a 
number of provisions. Any conflict of interest 
must be reported if it could affect the capacity 
of judgement. Board members must carefully 
watch over conflicts of interests that can occur 
between the company and its significant or 
controlling shareholders. The members of 
the board proposed by the latter shareholders 
must make sure that all board members are 
aware of the intentions and interests of those 
shareholders. Provision 6.9 takes care of the 
reporting requirements of conflicts of interest, 
including the procedure to protect the interest 
of the company, which has been followed for 
addressing this conflict. As article 7:96 CCA 
already provides in detailed disclosure rules in 
case of a direct or indirect conflict of interest 
of a financial nature, we are of the opinion that 
provision 6.9 of the Governance Code will be 
applicable in case another conflict of interest 
emerges. Also for the potential conflicts of 
interests between a controlling shareholder and 
the company, the Belgian legislator provides in 
a detailed procedure in article 7:97 CCA. This 
article is currently under revision, inter alia to 
make it compliant with Directive (EU) 2017/828 
(see hereinafter).
Remuneration of the board and top 
management is set in principle 7. Each member 
must be remunerated in a fair and responsible 
manner. Thereto a remuneration policy has to 
be developed. While the content of the report 
is provided in the CCA, the objectives for 
developing this policy are further developed in 
the provision 7.1 of the Code 2020: attracting, 
rewarding and retaining talent; promoting the 
achievement of the strategic objectives and 
promoting sustainable value creation. Belgian 
listed companies are already familiar with the 
general meeting voting for the remuneration 
report23. The Code 2020 also requires the 
general meeting to vote on the remuneration 
policy and adds that even if the remuneration 
report has been approved, the board should 
take action when a significant proportion of 
the votes have been cast against this policy. 
More in particular, the company “should take 
the necessary steps to address the concerns of 
those voting against it, and consider adapting 
its remuneration policy”. This principle is 
a forerunner of the expected changes of 
the CCA. In accordance with Directive (EU) 
2017/828 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement 
of long-term shareholder engagement24, the 
Belgian Parliament is discussing a proposal 
for a law transposing this Directive25, which 
23 See article 554 former Companies Code and article 7:149 
Belgian CCA.
24 Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/
EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement, Pb. L. 20 May 2017, nr. 60, 1.
25 Proposition de loi portant transposition de la directive (UE) 
2017/828 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 17 mai 
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includes the introduction of a new article 
7:89/1 CCA that requires listed companies to 
develop a remuneration policy26. This proposal 
does not request the company to respond 
to the significant opposition of an approved 
remuneration policy. However, corporate 
governance practices are also familiar with 
this requirement. The UK Code 2018 requires 
from the company an explanation what actions 
it intends to take to consult shareholders in 
order to understand the reasons behind the 
significant opposition, an update on the views 
of the shareholders within the next six months 
and a disclosure of a summary in the next 
annual report explaining this issue27. Significant 
opposition is defined as 20 per cent or more of 
the votes being cast against the agenda item. 
In the UK there is a database on the Public 
Register where the details of votes against 
can be consulted28. A similar register does not 
exist in Belgium. Finally, it can be noted that 
this provision could also be part of principle 
8 of the Code 2020, which further elaborates 
the relationship between shareholders and the 
company.
An important new remuneration topic can 
be found in provision 7.6. Non-executive 
board members should receive part of their 
2017 modifiant la directive 2007/36/CE en vue de promouvoir 
l’engagement à long terme des actionnaires, et portant 
des dispositions en matière de société et d’association/
Wetsvoorstel tot omzetting van Richtlijn (EU) 2017/828 van 
het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 17 mei 2017 tot 
wijziging van Richtlijn 2007/36/EG wat het bevorderen van 
de langetermijnbetrokkenheid van aandeelhouders betreft, 
en houdende vennootschaps- en verenigingsbepalingen, 







26 This policy should contain the information as required in Directive 
(EU) 2017/828 which goes beyond the limited information that 
the remuneration policy must contain in accordance with article 
3:6, § 3, 1° en 2° CCA, that currently must be disclosed in the 
remuneration report. 
27 Provision 4 of section 1 Leadership of the UK Code.
28 This database is maintained by The Investment Association (see 
www.theinvestmentassociation.org/publicregister.htm).
remuneration in the form of shares, but stock 
options should not be granted. The shares 
must be held for at least three years and at least 
one year after leaving the board. Whilst less 
explicit, other corporate governance codes do 
not oppose this component in a remuneration 
package of a non-executive director. In the 
UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 a non-
prohibition provision for granting shares is to 
be found: “Remuneration for all non-executive 
directors should not include share options 
or other performance-related elements”. 
Consequently, shares can even be granted 
without time constraints. Recommendation 22 
and 24.2 of the French Corporate Governance 
Code 2018 reads: “The Board of Directors 
defines a minimum number of registered shares 
that the company officers must retain through 
to the end of their term of office [… for] non-
executive directors […] it is not desirable to 
award variable compensation, stock options or 
performance shares.” The Belgian Code follows 
the provisions of the other codes but it adds 
that shares must be kept until after the end 
of the directorship. Further, it remains unclear 
what the consequences of a breach of the 
time constraint would be. Article 7:91 CCA can 
provide in a solution: shares, option on shares 
and other rights for acquiring shares have a 
vesting period of at least three years, unless the 
general meeting of shareholders or the articles 
of association decides otherwise.
Finally, with respect to the remuneration of the 
executive board members and management, the 
work of the Corporate Governance Commission 
reducing the number of principles as to maintain 
only principles that are not already provided in 
the CCA is very visible. Out of the 10 principles 
addressing executive remuneration in the 2009 
Code only 6 have been preserved. In particular, 
the disclosure requirements and part of the 
severance pay arrangements are now part of 
the Code of Companies and Associations and 
were superfluous in the corporate governance 
code. It can be questioned whether some of 
the remaining principles are or will also become 
part of the CCA in light of the transposition of 
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Directive (EU) 2017/828. Principle 7.7 currently 
requires a policy in which the components of 
the remuneration package as well as the balance 
between the components are described. In 
the proposal for the amendment of the CCA, 
transposing the Directive, a more detailed 
remuneration report, taking into account 
the business strategy, long term interest and 
sustainability of the company is requested29, 
making more than likely some other provisions 
in the 2020 Code redundant.
Principle 8 develops the relationship between 
the company and its shareholders and contains 
some new provisions, which were not part 
in the 2009 Code. The provisions on the 
communication with the shareholders and 
the encouraging use of the general meeting 
of shareholders are similar to those of the 
Code 2009. New is the provision of having 
the controlling and significant shareholders 
expressed their strategic objectives in the board. 
Further, provision 8.7 requests from the board 
a debate on the appropriateness of having a 
relationship agreement with the controlling and/
or significant shareholder. The 2020 Code does 
not provide in additional guidance as to what in 
such a relationship agreement should be agreed 
between the company and the shareholder. 
However, more than likely the Corporate 
Governance Commission was inspired by the 
UK Listing Requirements that requires since 
2014 from premium listed companies on the 
London Stock Exchange with a controlling 
shareholder holding more than 30 per cent 
of the votes to be cast at the general meeting 
to enter in a relationship agreement. Listing 
Requirement 6.5.4.30 provides in the details 
of the content of this agreement. First, there 
needs to be a confirmation that transactions 
and relationships with the controlling 
shareholder will be conducted at arm’s length 
and on normal commercial terms. Second, 
the controlling shareholder confirms that it 
restrains from any action that has the effect 
29 See the proposed art. 7:89/1, § 2 Belgian CCA.
30 This listing requirement can be found: https://www.handbook.
fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/6/5.html# (last accessed 15 November 
2019).
of preventing the company complying with 
the listing requirements. Third, the controlling 
shareholder shall not table any resolution 
that intends to circumvent the application of 
the Listing Requirements. Nonetheless, these 
requirements cannot easily be transferred in the 
Belgian environment. First, the structure of the 
legislation is different. The relationship between 
the controlling shareholder and the company 
is not separately addressed in the Euronext 
Brussels Stock Exchange Requirements.31 
Second, the CCA already addresses a number 
of elements that the relationship agreement 
between a listed company and the controlling 
shareholder must develop in accordance 
with the UK listing rules. We refer for instance 
to article 7:97 CCA that contains a detailed 
procedure for a decision of the board related 
to a transaction or deed executing a transaction 
involving a controlling shareholder of the 
listed company. We hope that the Corporate 
Governance Commission will further elaborate 
guidelines with the content of this relationship 
agreement.
We also note that the provisions that are 
dedicated to the position of institutional 
investors are reformulating the provisions of 
the former 2009 Code but those provisions will 
become largely redundant when the proposal for 
a new law transposing Directive (EU) 2017/808 
will become effective. Indeed, the Directive 
requires from institutional investors to “develop 
and publicly disclose an engagement policy 
that describes how they integrate shareholder 
engagement in their investment strategy, […] 
how they monitor investee companies on 
relevant matters, including strategy, financial 
and non-financial performance and risk, 
capital structure, social and environmental 
impact and corporate governance, conduct 
dialogues with investee companies, exercise 
voting rights and other rights attached to 
shares, cooperate with other shareholders, 
communicate with relevant stakeholders of the 
31 An overview of these listing requirements can be found in 
Euronext & Jones Day, Vade-Mecum from A to Z, January 2019, 
https://www.euronext.com/en/regulation/euronext-regulated-
markets, 85 p. (last accessed 15 November 2019).
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investee companies and manage actual and 
potential conflicts of interests in relation to their 
engagement”. Next, institutional investors shall 
disclose how this policy has been implemented. 
However, the Belgian Code 2020 approaches 
the developments of the relationship between 
institutional investors and the company from 
the company’s and board’s perspective instead 
of from the investors’ perspective. Further, 
provision 8.9 requests the board to encourage 
the institutional investors to discuss its corporate 
governance of the company before the general 
meeting takes place. In the Directive (EU) 
2017/808 it is not specified that institutional 
investors have to discuss their engagement 
policy before the general meeting takes place.
Principle 9 of the 2020 Code retakes 
principle 4 of the 2009 Code. The principle 
is accompanied with only three provisions. 
It refers to the assessment and transparency 
of the governance structure of the company. 
In the former 2009 Code, the principle only 
referred to the appointment and evaluation of 
the board and its members. As the legislator has 
opted for a choice between the one-tier and a 
two-tier board, it required a broader approach 
of the governance structure in the 2020 Code.
Finally, principle 10 requiring compliance with 
the 2020 Code is short. Four provisions highlight 
the comply or explain regime, the process of 
addressing the deviations from the code and 
informing the shareholders, the content of the 
deviations and board’s role in addressing the 
deviations (inter alia with the shareholders). In 
the former 2009 Code those provisions were 
part of the first principle.
The auditor and the 2020 Belgian Code 
on Corporate Governance
The first corporate governance definition, 
which is to be found in the Cadbury Code of 
1992, states that “corporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. Obviously, the Code’s focal point 
is the board of directors. However, there were 
also 37 provisions in the Cadbury Code on audit 
related matters. These provisions addressed 
objectivity, auditor rotation, the expectation gap, 
etc. In the meantime, many of those issues have 
been addressed in the UK legal framework that 
strengthened the independence requirements, 
introduced strict rotation requirements, the 
relationship with the audit committee etc. 
Nevertheless, in UK Code 2018 there are still 
three principles dedicated to audit and internal 
control, further elaborated in 8 provisions.32
For the Belgian Code 2020, the question can 
be raised: Where are the external auditors? A 
“search” of the Belgian Code 2020 of the term 
“external auditor” results in five hits of which 
four are to be found in the provisions and one 
in the recitals.
In provision 3.5, the sixth condition for 
independent directors states that the external 
auditor of the company, or a related company 
or person is not eligible as independent 
director and neither the person who has been 
auditor of the company in the previous three 
years. This condition is not new. The law of 
17 December 200833 introduced in article 
526ter of the former Companies Act the 
definition of independent director. It contained 
the requirement that a person is not eligible as 
independent director if he has been, in three 
years before an appointment as director, a 
partner or an employee of the (former) audit 
firm of the company, a related company or 
32 However, it must be noted that the position of the external 
auditor is only referred to one time in the principles. More 
precisely, Principle M. states: “The board should establish 
formal and transparent policies and procedures to ensure the 
independence and effectiveness of internal and external audit 
functions”
33 Official Gazette, 29 December 2008.
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entity as defined in article 11 of the former 
Companies Code. The transfer of the conditions 
for becoming an independent director from the 
law to the code allows for a deviation of any 
of the independence requirements. As such, it 
is, with an appropriate explanation, as of now, 
possible to elect as independent director a 
former auditor, if article 3:62, § 3 CCA has been 
complied with.
Next, three provisions that address the role and 
position of the audit committee refer to the 
external auditor. First, according to provision 
4.12 it belongs to the audit committee’s role to 
monitor the management’s responsiveness […] 
to the recommendations made in the external 
auditor’s management letter. This duty of 
the audit committee is not new and retakes 
the former provision 5.2./26 of the 2009 
Code. However, the requirement to monitor 
the management response to the auditor’s 
management letter is not a legal duty of the 
audit committee. Nonetheless, it belongs to 
the audit committee’s role to monitor the legal 
control of the accounts that also has to include 
a control of the follow-up of the questions and 
recommendations of the external auditor.34
Provision 4.15 of the 2020 Code is identical 
to the last sentence of provision 5.2./31 of the 
2009 Code and guarantees the direct access 
of the external auditor to the chairman of the 
board and the chairman of the audit committee. 
The 2020 Code provision 4.15 did not retake 
the other parts of provision 5.2./31 of the 2009 
Code. Hence, the external auditor is free to 
choose who it should address in case an urgent 
issue needs to be discussed: the auditor can 
either approach the chair of the board or of the 
audit committee or both. Formerly, the auditor 
should consider the audit committee as the first 
middleman.
The third provision with a reference to the 
external auditor is provision 4.16. The audit 
committee must make sure that at least once 
34 Art. 7:99, §4, 4° Belgian CCA.
a year the audit plan as well as issues arising 
from the audit process are discussed with the 
external auditor. This provision softens the 
former requirements in provision 5.2./29 of 
the 2009 Code, which required from the audit 
committee and the external auditor to meet at 
least twice a year to discuss issues arising from 
the audit process, material weaknesses in the 
internal control and the terms of reference.
Finally, the 2020 Code identifies in its general 
part the external auditor as one of the parties 
that is involved in the monitoring duties 
regarding the application of code. The other 
monitors are the shareholders, the Financial 
Services Markets Authority and the Commission 
itself that will have the level of application of the 
Code monitored every year. The 2020 Code did 
not further specify the scope of the monitoring 
duty of the external auditor. More than likely 
the Corporate Governance Commission refers 
to article 3:75, §1, 6° CCA that requires the 
external auditor to opine whether the annual 
report of the company is in accordance with 
the annual accounts and aligned with article 3:5 
and 3:6 CCA. The latter articles enumerate the 
content of the annual report. The content list 
includes for the listed companies a corporate 
governance statement and a remuneration 
report. Article 3:6 CCA also provides in a detailed 
list of the content of the governance statement 
and in particular a reference to the 2020 Code, 
its application and whether, how and why the 
company deviates from the provisions of the 
2020 Code.
Conclusion
After ten years, the time is now for the 
modernization of the corporate governance 
code. The Belgian Corporate Governance 
Commission worked hard on the modernization 
of the 2020 Belgian Code on Corporate 
Governance Code. The Code reflects the 
evolution in Belgian corporate governance, 
it validly defaults from revolution, and it 
took into account a number of international 
developments like the emphasis on long-term 
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sustainable value creation. The Commission 
also waited for the publication of the new 
Code on Companies and Associations and 
successfully aligned the Corporate Governance 
Code with this CCA. This short analysis of the 
Code’s Principles and provisions show that the 
Code adequately balances the interests of many 
stakeholders.
We have some concerns related to a limited 
number of issues. We refer in particular to 
the division of powers between the board of 
directors and the remuneration committee and 
audit committee that have been established in 
accordance with the 2020 Code in companies 
that do not mandatorily have to establish 
those committees. Next, the transfer of the 
independence criteria for directors from the 
law to the code creates less certainty: if not 
all conditions for deviating from the provisions 
have been adequately addressed, can the 
director be considered “independent enough” 
for the specific legislative duties that can also 
involve the work of the external auditor, like the 
one for additional non-audit services?
Obviously, as corporate governance is not 
static, the Commission’s work is not over. First, 
over the last decade, the Commission has 
issued some helpful explanatory notes on high-
quality explanations, related party transactions, 
the nomination of external auditors, internal 
control and reporting on remuneration. The 
new Code will affect some of those notes, 
which need to be updated. Also, the Institute of 
External Auditors and the Belgian Association of 
Listed Companies supported by the Corporate 
Governance Commission will have to consider 
the modernization of the 2014 guidelines for an 
effective relation between the audit committee, 
the internal audit and the external audit.35




accessed 15 November 2019).
 https://www.corporategovernancecommittee.be/sites/default/
files/generated/files/page/2014.12.18_lignes_de_conduite_
Second, also new legislative developments 
affect the 2020 Code. We will see in the near 
future new mandatory rules on the approval of 
the remuneration policy, related party conflicts 
and engagement policies for institutional 
investors36, which will invite the Commission to 
reconsider some of the best practice provisions. 
Corporate governance remains, in the first 
place, a never ending process.
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Op 9 mei 2019 verscheen de langverwachte 
Belgische Corporate Governance Code 
2020. De publicatie liep vertraging op omdat 
de Corporate Covernance Commissie 
de publicatie van het nieuwe Wetboek 
van Vennootschappen en Verenigingen 
afwachtte. De Code bestaat uit 10 principes 
die genoteerde vennootschappen moeten 
naleven en tal van bepalingen met 
aanbevelingen om in de implementatie van 
de principes te voorzien. Hoewel de Code 
2020 vele principes en bepalingen uit de 
Code 2009 herneemt, vallen er ook vele 
nieuwigheden te noteren. Zo staat voortaan 
duurzame waardecreatie centraal waarmee 
de Code 2020 aansluit bij de corporate 
governance codes van de ons omringende 
landen. Ook bevat de Code 2020 de criteria 
waaraan een onafhankelijke bestuurder moet 
voldoen. 
Er rijzen hierbij ook vragen. Zo vergt het 
enige creativiteit voor genoteerde banken 
om aan alle bepalingen te kunnen voldoen 
en is het niet duidelijk op welke wijze 
vennootschappen die geen wettelijke 
verplichting hebben tot inrichting van een 
audit- en remuneratiecomité, moeten 
omspringen met de principe 4 over de 
inrichting van gespecialiseerde comités.
De commissaris en/of bedrijfsrevisor komt in 
de Code 2020 nauwelijks aan bod. Algemeen 
wordt de commissaris een toezichtsfunctie 
toegedicht en stuurt de Code 2020 aan op 
een regelmatig contact van de commissaris 
met het auditcomité.
De Commissie Corporate Governance 
leverde een “deugdelijk” document af, dat 
slechts een beperkt aantal vragen doet 
rijzen doch spoedig, met de omzetting van 
de tweede Aandeelhoudersrichtlijn, een 
bijwerking zal behoeven.
Résumé
Le Code belge de gouvernance d’entreprise 
2020 tant attendu a été publié le 9 mai 
2019. La publication a été retardée au motif 
que la Commission Corporate Governance 
attendait la publication du nouveau Code 
des sociétés et des associations. Le Code 
comporte 10 principes devant être respectés 
par les sociétés cotées, ainsi que de 
nombreuses recommandations pour assurer 
leur mise en œuvre effective. Bien que le 
Code 2020 reprenne de nombreux principes 
et dispositions du Code 2009, il contient 
également beaucoup de nouveautés. Ainsi, 
l’accent est désormais mis sur la création de 
valeur durable, ce qui permet au Code 2020 
de s’aligner sur les codes de gouvernance 
d’entreprise des pays voisins. Le Code 2020 
comporte également les critères auxquels un 
administrateur indépendant doit répondre. 
Cette nouvelle édition soulève toutefois 
quelques questions. Ainsi, les banques cotées 
doivent faire preuve d’une certaine créativité 
pour pouvoir se conformer à toutes les 
dispositions et la manière dont les sociétés 
n’ayant pas d’obligation légale de mise en 
place d’un comité d’audit et de rémunération 
doivent appliquer le principe 4 relatif à la 
création de comités spécialisés n’est pas 
claire.
Le rôle du commissaire et/ou du réviseur 
d’entreprises est à peine évoqué dans le 
Code 2020. En général, le commissaire se 
voit attribuer une fonction de contrôle et 
le Code 2020 vise un contact régulier du 
commissaire avec le comité d’audit.
La Commission Corporate Governance 
a fourni un document « valable », qui ne 
soulève qu’un nombre limité de questions, 
mais qui devra bientôt être mis à jour suite 
à la transposition de la deuxième directive 
relative aux droits des actionnaires.
